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RECENT CASES.
ATTACHMENT-ALIAS WRIT.-DYE ET AL. V. CRARY FT AL., 78 PAC. 533
(N. M.).-Held, that, there being no statutory authority for the issuance of an
alias writ of attachment, such a writ gives the court no jurisdiction over
property levied on by virtue of it.
It is a well settled principle that, attachment being in derogation of
common law, statutes in connection therewith must be strictly construed in
favor of the one against whom the proceeding is employed. Penoyer v.
Kelsey, z5o N. Y. 77; Ritchie v. Sayers, ioo Fed. 520. But it is also true
that a court should not push the strict construction so far as to leave the
creditor remediless. Taylor v. Ricards, 9 Ark. 378; Rawles v. Hoare, 61
Barb. 266. In a few jurisdictions even the general principle is denied. Force
v. Hubbard, 26 Ga. 289; Runyan v. Morgan, 7 Humph. 2io. It would
seem that with this conflict, this particular point, which might well come in
the exception above, ought to be decided more upon general justice than
strictly under the broad rule. And it is so held in most jurisdictions.
Majarrietta v. Saenz, 8o N. Y. 547; Elliot v. Stevens, io Iowa 418. But
other jurisdictions cling to the other holding. Pack v. American Trust,
etc., Bank, 172 Ill. 192; Watson v. Noblett, 65 N. J. L. 506.
BANKRUPTcY-DISCHARGE-EFFECT OF AMENDMENT OF 1903.-IN RE NEELEY,
12 AM. B. R. 407.-Held, that the amendment of 19o3 to Sec. 14b, Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, which forbids a discharge if the bankrupt has been
granted a discharge in voluntary proceedings within six years, is not retro-
active, but that a new condition of discharge was fixed, in case of a petition
of bankruptcy filed after passage of the amendment.
There is no constitutional right to a discharge in bankruptcy, and
regulations changing the conditions upon which discharge will be granted are
not unconstitutional. In re Peterson, io Am. B. P- 355. A statute is not
necessarily retroactive because its operation in a given case may depend
upon an occurrence anterior to its passage. Endlich Inter. Stat., Sec. 280.
Under a state bankruptcy law a provision similar to the amendment here
considered was held not to be retroactive. Eastman et al v. Hillard, 7
Metc. 42o. To this effect have been the decisions occurring under the
previous national bankruptcy acts. In re Gifford, 16 N. B. R. 35; In re
Grfflts, io N. B. R. 456. Contra, In re Sheldon, 8 Ben. 67. In construing
another section of the amendment of 1903, which forbids a discharge if the
applicant has obtained property on credit from any person upon a materially
false statement in writing, it was held that the statute was not retroactive,
but that it merely set forth a condition precedent to discharge. In re Scott,
126 Fed. 98z;. In re Peterson, sufira. The case of In- re Carleton, 131 Fed.
146, is directly in point, and sustains the holding in the present case.
CARRIERS-PASSENGER TICKETS-STATUTZ OF LIMITATIONS.-CASSIANO V
GALvESTON, H. & S. A. R. Co., 82 S. W. 8o6 (Tsx.).-Where a passenger
presents a railroad ticket, unlimited as to time, but purchased fourteen years
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before, held, that, as the statute of limitations ran from the date of issue, the
person is a trespasser and can be ejected from the train.
Undoubtedly this is the first adjudication upon this question. The court
reads into the contract an implied term that the ticket would be used within
a reasonable time, and says that it occupied a position analogous to that of a
demand note, upon which, in Texas, the statute runs from date of issue.
Kamfiman v. Williams, 7o Tex. 568. The same court formerly held in
R. Co. v. Dennis, 4 Tex. Civ. App. go, that a passenger presenting a ticket
limited as to time could not be lawfully expelled from the train, though the
time limit had expired; but this decision is'an anomaly. McGhee v. Dris-
dale, iiI Ala. 597; Hill v. R. Co., 63 N. Y. IoI; Grogan v. R. CO., 39 W.
Va. 415. Where, however, there are restrictions as to the use of a ticket
which do not appear upon its face, and which are not communicated to the
passenger, he cannot be expelled. Maroney v. R. Co., IO6 Mass. 153.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-FISH AND GAME LEGISLATION
-NONRESIDENT LANDOWNERS.-STATE V. MALLORY, 83 S. W. 955 (AR.).-
Held, that an act declaring it unlawful for any non-resident to hunt or fish at
any season of the year is unconstitutional as denying the equal protection of
the law in so far as it prevents the same enjoyment of his property right by a
non-resident landowner as is afforded a resident landowner. Hill, C. J., and
Battle, J., dissenting-.
The constitutionality of the statute turned upon the question of the owner-
ship of game as between the state and the individual. That the state has the
authority to control fishing in navigable waters is well settled. Preble v.
Brown, 47 Me. 286; Manchester v. Mass. 139 U. S. 24. Furthermore, it has
been held that an act prohibiting the shipment of game out of the state is con-
stitutional. State v. Exfiress Co., 58 Minn. 403. Magner v. Peofile, 97 Ill.
320, goes so far as to declare that ownership of wild animals is in the people of
the state, and no one has a property right in them. Sterling v. Jackson, 69
Mich. 488, and State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 393, sustain the same opinion.
Cooley, on the contrary, states that the right to take fish in the fresh water
streams of the country belongs to the owner of the soil under them, to the ex-
clusion of the public. Cooley on Torts, 329. Wickham v. Hawker, 7 Mees.
& W. 63, holds fish and game to be the property of the landowner. Likewise,
in many of the states the right to fish and take fish is held to be a right of profit
in lands. Cobb v. Davenfiort, 33 N. J. 223; Adams v. Pease, 2 Conn. 481.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INFRINGEMENT ON JUDIcIARY-REGULATIONS OF
TaiAL.-RIGLANDER V. STAR Co., go N. Y. SuP,. 772.-A statute provided
that if a case was entitled to preference, in order of trial, the Court "Imust
designate a day during the term" at which the application was made, "on
which day the cause shall be heard, and, if there be two or more causes so
designated for the same day, the said causes shall be heard in order of their
date of issue." Held, that the statute was unconstitutional, as depriving the
judiciary of the right to hear preferred cases according to the circumstances of
each particular case. Laughlin, J., dissenting.
There is nothing in the Federal constitution which forbids a state legis-
lature from interfering with state judiciary. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27
U. S. 38; Hartshorne v. Sleght, 3 John. 554. The legislature, in undertak-
ing to regulate rules of pleading, does not usurp judicial functions. Whiting
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v. Townsend, 57 Cal. 515. The legislature may regulate procedure. In re
Probate Blanks, 71 N. H. 621. A legislature may pass laws affecting powers
lodged in the several justices of a supreme court, as distinguished from the
court itself. State v. Taylor, 68 N. J. L. 276. A court may make reasonable
rules in regard to fixing a time for a hearing before it, and such rules must
prevail, even though in conflict with a statute. Herndon v. Imherial Fire
Ins. Co., iII N. C. 384. A court may not make a rule which deprives one of
a right secured by law. Main v. Lynch, 54 Md. 658. A court has power to
change its own calendar and to fix dates of trials. Merchants' Nat. Rank
v. Greenhood, 16 Mont. 395. As the statute in question would give the court
no discretion in fixing a time for hearing of preferred causes, the decision
would seem to be proper. Jones v. Shear, 21 Vt. 426.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-NOTICE OF TAX SALE-DENIAL OF DuE PRoczss.-
WILLIAMS V. PITLOCK, 77 PAC. 385 (WAsH.).-Held, that a statute which,
without providing for notice, makes persons not known to have an interest in
property assessed parties to proceedings to collect unpaid taxes by sale of the
land, does not deprive a non-resident owner, whose land was assessed to one
not an owner, of due process of law.
The name of the owner of real property, when known and entered on the
assessment roll, is a material part of a notice of the sale thereof for taxes;
Marx v. Hanthorn, 3o Fed. 579; and a statute making the tax deed conclu-
sive evidence of notice is unconstitutional, as a denial of due process of law.
Kelly v. Herrall, 2o Fed. 364; McCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa 356. One who
purchases land subject to a tax lien is entitled to notice of a tax sale of the
same. Quinlan v. Callahan, 8z Ky. 618. A tax sale of land owned by
several heirs upon notice to one is invalid; Thurston vt. Miller, io R. I. 358;
nor is notice to one of several co-tenants sufficient. Howze v. Dew, go Ala.
178. In Lague v. Boagni. 32 La. Ann. 9x2, it is held, contrary to the
present case, that notice to the real owner is always essential. But the
general rule seems to be otherwise. Franklin Coal Co. v. Bertel, iogPa. 55o;
Shkerry t. Goodwin, 44 Minn. 207.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PoLICE POWER-PossESSION OF IMPORTED GAME IN
CLOSE SEASON.-PEOPLE v. BOOTMAN ET AL., 72 N. E. 505 (N. Y.).-Held, that
it is in the police power of a state to make the possession of imported game in
the close season unlawful.
The original statutes of New York State, prohibiting the sale, possession,
etc., of game in the close season, were not construed to include iihported game
because they did not expressly do so. Similar statutes have been so con-
strued in other states. Com. v. Hall, 128 Mass. 41o; Com. t. Wilkenson,
139 Pa. St. 298. Other courts hold the contrary. State v. Randolfih, I Mo.
App. IS; Roth v. State, Si Ohio St. 2o9. In other states possession of game
is frima facie evidence of its importation, subject to be rebutted. Peofile
t. O'Neill, 71 Mich. 325; Com. V. Wilkenson, sufira. Though killed at a
time and place lawful, it is a violation, if possessed in the close season.
State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 393; State vt. Judy, 7 Mo. App. 524. The laws so
interpreted are not unconstitutional and are not are an interference with
interstate commerce. Phelfs v. Racey, 5 Daley 235; fcReady v. Va., 94
U. S. 391. A state cannot prohibit the importation of lawful merchandise
into its limits but after the act of transportation has terminated the possession
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of the article may be declared unlawful. Bowman v. Chi. etc., R. R. Co.,
125 U. S. 465. This may discourage interstate commerce but it is not such
regulation as is unconstitutional. Mfagner v. Peofile, 97 Ill. 320.
CRIMINAL LAW- SUFFICIENCY OF INDICTMENT- REVIEw.- PEOPLE V.
WIECHERs ET AL., 72 N. E. 50x (N. Y.).-Held, that an indictment, not
objected to at the trial, nor demurred to before trial, nor objected to by
motion in arrest of judgment, could not be attacked by appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the offense not being a capital one, though it does not charge any
criminal offense. Cullen, C. J., and O'Brien, J., dissenting.
Under the N. Y. Code of Criminal Procedure demurrer lies to an indict-
ment when the facts do not constitute a crime. Peopile v. D'Argencour, 32
Hun. 175; Peofile v. Kane, 43 App. Div. 472. Objection may be taken at the
trial under plea of not guilty or in arrest of judgment. Peofile v. Davis. 56
N. Y. 95; Peofile v. Ufiton, 38 Hun 107. Plea of not guilty is a denial of
every material allegation in the indictment. Peofile v. Benjamin, 2 Park.
Cr. 201. The fundamental defects appearing on the face of the record may
be reviewed and corrected on appeal. The bill of exceptions enlarges the
scope of review, but does not exclude other grounds. Peofile v. Thomfison,
41 N. Y. x. The defect is not cured by the verdict. Peoile v. Davis, 4
Park. Cr. 67. Appeal, like writ of error, brings up all questions of error in
the indictment, verdict, or any part of the record. State v. Dark, 8 Blackf.
526; Con. v. Tlomfison, r3 B. Mon 159. If there was no crime charged the
verdict of guilty could not be broader than the charge, and consequently there
is nothing to support the judgment. If the judgment is void a writ of habeas
corfius would lie. U. S. v. Patterson, 29 Fed. 775; In re Garvey, 7 Colo.
384; ExjOarte Reynolds, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 437.
BASEMENTS-DRAINAGE-SURFACE WATERS.-DAvIS V. FRY, 78 PAC. I80
(OKL.).-When surface waters by natural drainage collectin anatural basin or
depression upon the premises of a dominant tenement, and escape therefrom
only by percolation or evaporation, forming thereby a lake or pond, permanent
in its character, held, that the waters so collected lose the character of surface
water, and may not, by artificial means, other than those incident to the cultiva-
tion of the soil, be drained to the damage of a servient tenement without
liability in damages for such act.
When the situation of two adjoining fields is such that the water falling,
or collected by melting snow, and the like, upon one, naturally descends upon
the other, the owner of the lower must suffer that it be so discharged if de-
sired by the upper owner, but the latter cannot by artificial trenches cause the
natural mode of its being discharged to be changed to the injury of the lower
field. Washburn, Easements, 353. Most of the decisions in various states
are unanimous in the opinion that the owner of the upper heritage may im-
prove his lands by mining or agricultural operations, although thereby the
volume of water discharged upon the inferior land is increased, but that he is
liable for damage caused by his digging ditches for purposes of draining.
Kaufman v. Griesemer, 26 Pa. St. 407; Hogenson v. Railway Co., 31 Minn.
224. In Hughes v. Anderson, 68 Ala. 280, it was held that the extent to
which a proprietor may go in this way must be determined by the degree of
comparative injury it may produce and relieve. A still more liberal decision
was rendered in Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn. 436, making simple drainage the
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lawful right of a person, if such drainage does not unnecessarily or unreason-
ably injure his neighbor. See also O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, 25 Minn. 355.
EQUITY-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-CONTRACT TO MAKE A WILL.-LAIRD ET
AL. V. VILA ET AL., zo N. W. 656 (MINN.).-Held, that when a party has
legally bound himself to will his property to minor relatives in consideration
that the beneficiaries shall assume a peculiar and domestic relation to the
promisor, and render him services of a character to make it impossible to
estimate their value by any pecuniary standard, and the agreement is executed
on behalf of the promisee and beneficiaries, a specific performance of the
contract will be decreed.
A person may make a valid contract to devise his lands in a particular
way. Parsell v. Stryker, 41 N. Y. 480; East v. Solihie, 72 N. C. 562. And
specific performance on such contracts may be had. Burns v. Smith, 21 Mont.
251; Johnson v. Hubbell, io N. J. Eq. 332. Especially is this so where through
trust in the agreement improvements have been put upon the land. Harman
v. Harman, 70 Fed. 894; Erwin v. Erwin, 139 N. Y. 616. And it may be
the same even though the contract be parol. Brown v. Sutton, 129 U. S. 238;
Walters v. Walters, 132 Ill. 467; contra, Morgan v. Tillet, 55 N. C. 39.
There are cases almost identical with the one under discussion. Sharkey vz.
McDermott, 91 Mo. 647; Godine v. Kidd, 64 Hun 585. A few jurisdictions
do not follow the general rule. Stafford v'. Bartholomew, 2 Ind. 153;
Hazelton v.Reed, 46 Kan. 73. And even Illinois has held that such an agree-
ment cannot be specifically enforced on account of injustice to the heirs.
Woods v. E tans, 113 Ill. 186.
FIXTURES--OIL LEASE--REMOVAL ON DEFAULT.-GARTLAN ET AL. V. HICK-
MAN, 49 S. E. 14 (W. VA.).-Engines, oil-well rig, tanks, pipes, etc., were
placed on land under a lease, in which it was agreed that lessees should have
the privilege of removing them at any time. The lease was forfeited and
terminated for non-payment of rental. Held, that the machinery did not be-
come part of the realty.
There is a difference of opinion as to cases parallel to the above where
there was no agreement for removal. Roseville A. Min. Co. et. al. v. Iowa
Gulch Min. Co., i5 Colo. 29; Conrad v. Saginaw Min. Co., 54 Mich. 249;
Heffner v. Lewis, 73 Pa. St. 302. The agreement between the parties to con-
sider what might be realty as personalty will be enforced. Fratt vz. Whittier,
58 Cal. 126; Hunt v.Bay State Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279. Agreements could
not effect the rights of bona fide purchasers. Roswand v. Anderson, 33 Kan-
264; Bartholomew v. Hamilton, 1o5 Mass. 239. Nor is an agreement con-
clusive if serious damage would result to the freehold by their removal. Ford
v. Cobb, 2o N. Y. 344; Sword v'. Low, 122 Ill. 487. Abandonment of the
premises before the expiration of the lease is not waiver of the right to remove
fixtures where they were placed on the land with the intention of removing.
Conde vi. Lee, 17i N. Y. 662. Chattels placed on agricultural lands, to become
fixtures, must be germane to farming purposes. Perkins v. Swank, 43 Mass.
349; McJunkln v. Dupkree, 44 Tex. soo.
GUARANTY-CONSTRUCTION.-McAFEE v. WYCKOFF, 89 N. Y. Supp. 996.-
Held, that a guaranty of payment by a vendee for goods to be manufactured
by the vendor "as per contract," extended only to the price of goods actually
delivered and was not a guaranty for breach of contract.
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The present case is an excellent illustration of the doctrine that a guarantor
is not to be held liable beyond the exact stipulations of his contract. This rule
seems firmly established in New York. N, Y. Ins. Co. v. Lowenburg, 120
N. Y. 44; Smith v. Mollensen, 148 N. Y. 241. On the other hand, in Tennessee
the contract is construed most strongly against the guarantor. Bright v.
McKnight, i Sneed 168. And Missouri seems to hold a similar view. Hurly
v. Fidelity &- DefPosit Co., 95 Mo. App. 88. But in many jurisdictions neither
of these rules of construction meets with approval and the tendency is to con-
strue as an ordinary contract. Davis v. Wells, 104 U. S. I59; Wills v. Ross,
77 Ind i; Matthews v. Phels, 61 Mich. 327; and the construction should be as
favorable to the creditor as in case of any other contract. Swisher v. Deer-
ing, 204 Ill. 203. While it is impossible to reconcile these conflicting con-
structions the weight of authority seems to be against the strict rule adopted
in the present case.
INsuRANcz-LiE-AGENT-RELATiON TO INSURED.-REILLY v. EMPIE LIFE
INS. Co., go N. Y. SupP. 866. Held, that an insurance solicitor who takes an
application is the agent of the insurer, notwithstanding a clause in the con-
tract of insurance providing that the solicitor shall be the agent of the insured
as to all statements and answers made in the application; and thatit is therefore
competent, in an action on the policy, to show that the insured gave truthful
answers to the agent, who wrote false answers in the application. Woodward
and Jenks, JJ., dissenting.
The decision in question is in decided opposition to the holdings of the
Federal courts, which maintain that there is no reason that insurance policies
should be considered differently from other contracts. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v.
Fletcher, 117 U. S. 539. This view was sustained in Ryan v. World Mut.
Life Ins. CO., 41 Conn. 168, where it was held that errors made by the agent
invalidate the contract, because the insured is inexcusably negligent in not
reading the application. Lewis v. Ins. Co., 39 Conn. ioo; Richardson v.
Maine Ins. Co., 46 Me. 394. An early New York decision, Rohrbach v.
Germania Fire Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 47, was in harmony with the decisions just
mentioned, but later decisions in that state are in support of the present
holding. O'Farrell v. Met. Life Ins. Co., x68 N. Y. 592; Grattan v'. Met.
Life Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 274. NJow nearly all of the state courts have adopted
the rule that agents of insurance companies must be regarded as agents of the
insurers, not of the insured, on considerations of public policy, and have con-
sidered any stipulation to avoid their responsibility as void. Ins. Co. v.
Olmstead, 2X Mich. 246; Brandufi v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 27 Minn. 393.
INsuRANc--LiFE-LIMITATIoN or AcTION-VALIDITY.-UNION CENT. LiFz
INS. Co. V. SPINKS, 83 S. W. 615 (Ky.).-Held, that a provision in alifepolicy
to the effect that no suit shall be maintained thereon, unless begun within one
year from the death of the insured, is void, as in contravention of public policy,
the statute prescribing a period-of fifteen years for actions on such contracts.
Paynter, J., dissenting.
This unusual ruling is sustained by like decisions in only two of our states,
Nebraska and Indiana. Eagle Ins. Co. v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 9 Ind. 443,
declares void a stipulation in a fire insurance policy requiring suit to be
brought within six months after loss, as against public policy. In a like
manner the Nebraska court holds that it is the policy of the law to have but
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one law of limitations, and that to establish a limitation by contract there
must be a sufficient consideration. Barnes v. McMurtry, 29 Neb. 184. The
rest of the state courts and the Federal courts agree that a condition that suit
must be brought within a certain time is valid, unless unreasonable. Thomp3-
son v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 25 Fed. 296; Ins. Co. v'. West, 6 Ohio St. 6o2.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVANT-BREACH OF FACTORY ACT-
AssUMPTION OF RISK.-ESPENLAUB ET AL. V. ELLIS, 72 N. E. 527 (IND.).-Held,
in an action by a servant for injury received from a saw left unguarded, con-
trary to the provisions of the Factory Act, that he was entitled to recover
against the master, there being no such assumption of risk as would defeat
recovery.
A servant does not impliedly assume risks of service which are violations
of law by the master. Narramore v. Cleveland, C. C. &- St. L. R. Co., 96
Fed. 295; Durant v. Lex. Coal Min. Co., 97 Mo. 62. It is also held in the
cases cited that knowledge by the servant of the master's violation of the
statute requiring the saw or other machinery to be guarded is not a bar to
recovery. See also Britton v. Great Western Cotton Co., L. R. 7 Exch. 130.
Acts made for the protection of servants should be construed to effect their
purpose. Groves v. Wimborne, (1898), 2 Q. B. 402. The courts of New York
and Massachusetts place an opposite interpretation upon similar statutes.
The servant cannot recover for an injury resulting from an open and obvious
defect caused by the master's failure to perform a statutory duty. Knisley v.
Pratt, 148 N. Y. 372; O'Maley V. S. Boston Gaslight Co., 158 Mass. 135;
Powell v. Ashland Iron & Steel Co., 98 Wis. 35. The statute does not
abrogate the common law rule that if the servant knows of the unguarded con-
dition and appreciates the risk he cannot call upon his employer for indemnity.
McRickard v. Flint, 114 N. Y. 222; Goodridge v. Washington Mills Co.,
16o Mass. 234.
NEGLIGENCE-IMPUTABILITY-DRIVER OF VEHICLE AND GUEST.-EVENSON
V. L. & B. Ry. Co., 72 N. E. 355 (MAss.).-Held, that the right of one riding
with another to recover for injuries caused by the negligence of a street car
company is dependent upon the exercise of due care by his companion who
was driving.
The present case can only be reconciled with the previous decisions of
the same court upon the ground that the plaintiff himself failed to exercise
ordinary prudence. Allyn v. B. &- A. R. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77; Randolph
'. O'Riordon, x55 Mass. 331. In most jurisdictions it is now firmly established
that the negligence of a driver is not to be imputed to a guest who exercises
no control over him. Little v. Hackett, ii6 U. S. 336; Masterson v. N. Y.
C. R. R. Co., 84N. Y. 247; Cahill v. C. N O. &- T. P. Ry. Co., 92 Ky. 345.
The same rule applies to passengers in public hacks. East Tenn., Va. &- Ga.
Ry. Co. v. Markens, 88 Ga. 6o; Berke v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 102 M o. 544. But
recovery will be barred if the guest failed to use reasonable prudence. Flanagan
v. N Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 70 App. Div. (N. Y.) 505; Holden v.
MissouriRy. Co., 177 Mo. 456. The doctrine of imputed negligence is, how-
ever, still favored to a limited extent in a few jurisdictions. Ritger v. City
of Milwaukee, 99 Wis. 19o; Nesbit v. Garner, 75 Iowa 34; Omaha & R. V.
R. R. Co. v. Talbot, 48 Neb. 627. But the general tendency, as above
indicated, is toward the entire abandonment of the theory.
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NEGLIGENCE-INJURYTOCHILD-TrEzSSPASSERS.-POWERS v. OWEGO BRIDGE
CO., 89 N. Y. SUPP. zo3o.-Plaintiff, a child, was injured while playing about a
pile of lumberbelonging to the defendant, The lumber was not near any
public place and children had been repeatedly warned away from it. Held,
that the defendent owed no duty to the plaintiff beyond that which it owed to
other trespassers.
The doctrine here laid down finds much support among the latest decisions.
Paolino v. McKendall, 24 R. I. 432; O'Connor v. Brucker, 117 Ga. 451; Ann
Arbor R. Co. v. Kinz, 68 0. St. 21o. The owner of attractive machinery or
other property is not an insurer of infant trespassers. Frost v. Eastern R.
R. Co., 64 N. H. 22o; nor does the fact that the trespasser is an infant raise a
duty where none otherwise exists. Nolan v. N. Y., N, H. &. H. R. R. Co.,
53 Conn. 46r. A trespass by an infant is not excused because there is a
temptation to commit it. Holbrook v. Aldrich, 168 Mass. 15. The ex-
ceptional rule of liability for injury to child trespassers imposed by the so-
called "turn table" cases, Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, and U. P.R.
Co. v. McDonald, 152 U. S. 252, has bcen often rejected. Walsh v, Fitch-
burg R. R. Co., 145 N. Y. 301; Delaware, Etc. R. R. Co. v. Reich, 6I N. J.
L. 635; Ritz v. City of Wheeling, 45 W. Va. 262. The present case seems
fairly to express the general trend of the courts toward placing infant
trespassers upon the same basis as adults. xi Harvard Law Review, 349, 434.
NUIsANcE-CEmETFRY-INJUNcTION.-ELLIOTT V. FXRGUSON, 83 S. W. 56
(Tex.).-Held, that a petition to enjoin the location of a public cemetery
adjacent to Qne's land must show clearly and with reasonable certainty that a
danger to health would ensue.
A cemetery is not a nuisance Per se. On the contrary, under our modern
civilization, cemeteries are often richly adorned and made attractive. Lake
View v. Rose Hill Cem. Co., 70 Ill. 192. Yet a cemetery may become a
nuisance, whereit endangershealth by corrupting the surrounding atmosphere,
Monk v. Packard, 71 Me. 309; or, possibly, by polluting drinking water,
Ujrjohn v. Board of Health, 46 Mich. 542; Greencastle v. Hazelett, 23 Ind.
x86. Where it is clearly proved that there will be such a danger to health,
equity will intervene. Clark v. Lawrence, 6 Jones Eq. 83. But where the
danger apprehended is doubtful or contingent, the complainant will be left to
his remedy at law. Ellison v. Commissioners, 5 Jones Eq. 57. The few
decisions upon the subject are in accord with the ruling of the present case.
Musgrove v. Church of St. Louis, io La. Ann. 431; Begein v. City of
Anderson, 28 Ind. 79; with the possible exception of Jung v. Neraz, 71 Tex.
396.
SALEs-BREACH OF WARRANTY-AcCEPTANCE OF GOODS.-ALABAMA STEEL
AND WIRE Co. v. SYMONs, 83 S. W. 78 (Mo.).-Held, that upon receipt of nails
ordered by sample, acceptance of part of them, with knowledge that they are
defective, does not waive one's right to offset damages in an action upon the
price.
An acceptance of goods sold under an implied warranty, without objection,
raises a presumption of a waiver of one's right to damages for their defective
condition. Babcock v. Trice, x8 Ill. 42o. This is strengthened by continued
silence, Lewis v. Rountree. 78 N. C. 323; still more so by knowledge of the
defects, Morse v. Moore, 83 Me. 473; and by the use of the goods, Dayton v.
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Hoogland, 39 Ohio St. 671; without explanation, it might-then be conclusive.
But it is one of evidence only and is not a rule of law. English v, Com-
mission Co., 48 Fed. x96; except where the deficiency is merely formal, as of
time, place. etc. Morse v. Mloore, supra. This is the prevailing view in
England and in most of our jurisdictions. Chandelor v. Lofius, x Smith
Lead Cas. (8th Ed.), pt. x, 299, 36o. Though some jurisdictions, notably New
York, hold that there is a waiver by knowledge, where the warranty sprang
from an essential term of the contract. Burdick on Sales, 135, where the two
views are discussed.
SPECIFIC PERfORMANcE-DECREE AS TO PART INTEREST-INTENTION OF
PARTIES.-TILLERY v. LAND, 48 S. E. 824 (N. C.).-Where one of several
owners of land contracts to sell the entire property and a conveyance from the
other proprietors cannot be obtained, held, that, since the vendor's intention
was not to dispose of his own interest separately, in the absence of bad faith,
specific performance as to his share will not be decreed. Clark, C. J., and
Montgomery, J., dissenting.
In general inability to completely perform is no defense to a bill for
partial performance. Bell v. Thomf3son. 34 Ala. 633; Swepson v. Johnson,
84 N. C. 449. This rule applies to a tenant in common who without authority
agrees to sell the entire property. Keaton v. Brown, 57 N. J. Eq. 6oo. It
seems, however, that the contrary would be the rule in the absence of bad
faith. Lumsley v. Ravenscroft, i Q. B. 683; Cochran v. Blout, ix U. S.
350. Injackson v. Torrance, 83 Cal. 521, it was held that when a husband
and wife agree to sell property and the wife refuses to convey, specific perfor-
mance as to the husband's share will not be decreed, as such a contract was
never contemplated by the parties; and, analogously, an agreement for the
sale of property, including a homestead, which is void as to the homestead,
cannot be specifically enforced as to the remainder. Hall v. Loomis, 63
Mich. 709.
